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
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CONGRESS AND THE ARMY
BRIDGING THE GAP

BY

JIMMY R. MOORE
LTC, US ARMY

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ARMY WAR COLLEGE

CONGRESS AND THE ARMY
BRIDGING THE GAP

by

Jimmy R. Moore
Lieutenant Colonel, US Army

A RESEARCH REPORT SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY

CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA

June 1983

ABSTAINER

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RESEARCH REPORT SUMMARY

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AUTHOR: Jimmy R. Moore, Lieutenant Colonel, USA

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

We know only too well that war comes not when the forces of freedom are strong, but when they are weak. It is then that tyrants are tempted.

Ronald Reagan
(July 16, 1980)

Ronald Reagan set the stage for building a strong defense during his campaign for the presidency with the preceding statement. He has kept his pledge to strengthen the Nation's military forces even though our country has been faced with a difficult economic situation and a Congress that by no means fully supports or understands the needed defense improvements. The task is not one that will be accomplished in a short period of time. To complete the task we have begun, to redress the military balance with the Soviet Union, many years of sustained effort will be needed. Serious deficiencies in our military forces have compelled us to break with the past and develop new policies and programs. Major weaknesses in our defense programs that have resulted from years of neglect must be corrected. At the same time, we must also be looking ahead at the decades to come.

The responsibility for articulating our needs and advising the President, the Congress and the American people falls on the shoulders of the Army leadership. The cooperation of Congress is essential in constructing an Army that will be capable of performing the many missions that will be required now and in

the years to come. To deal effectively with Congress, we must promote and perpetuate an awareness and understanding of the Army and its directions. Our targeted audience must not be Congress alone. If we are to preserve the proper relationship of our role, every effort must be made to educate the general public and, most importantly, our children at every level. If we do business as seen by all and, in many instances, it is the perceptions of the public and our own soldiers that greatly influence the attitudes and responses of the members of Congress.

The thrust of this study will be oriented exclusively to business with the Congress. However, before plunging into a discussion of how we deal with Congress, it is important that we understand the nature of the operating climate facing the Army in the 1980's and 90's. Political and socioeconomic perspectives are essential in this regard and are leading to demands for large federal government, more economic efficiency, and controlled, effective uses of our money. As a result of these changing national needs and priorities, the Army faces new challenges in its mission in terms of policy definition, manpower allocations, performance and legislative programs. Taking these thoughts even further, it would be wise to look at the climate from a global perspective. Consider the following points:

- The International Environment

- Change - rapid, confusing and conflicting
- Political - unsettled, diverse, nationalism, militant religious movements, national conflict,

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United States Security Objectives - protect United States

homeland, deter attack, fight and win if deterrence fails, access to vital resources (oil, minerals), assist allies (NATO, Mideast, Asia, Africa), discourage Soviet expansion.

These points serve to further solidify the dynamic, diverse climate which the Army is operating in today and the future. We have no hope of selling our programs if we do not understand what we are facing.

Modernization is the Army's greatest challenge. Aggressive and effective initiatives and coordination are essential if we are to obtain the resources to continue with our modernization efforts. The Army of the future must be a highly mobile and rapidly deployable force, requiring organizations, equipment and systems capable of operating in diverse climates and areas. The Army, Department of Defense, the Congress, or the President may choose to modify some of our specific functions from time to time, but overall, the global climate will not change very significantly. We must understand the challenges and be prepared to articulate our needs. No matter how you slice the pie, the bottom line is resources and resources translate to dollars. Dollars in turn are controlled by Congress. General Omar Bradley might well have said it best with his statement, "the military policy of the United States is shaped by Congress because Congress controls the appropriations which in the final analysis controls the military policy." Whether we agree or disagree with General Bradley's thesis, the fact remains that we will be held accountable for our actions. The Army leadership must be prepared

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CHAPTER II

CONGRESS AND THE ARMY-HISTORICAL RELATIONS

Congress and the Army have been historically bound since the First Continental Congress as our new nation made its move to free itself from British domination. The Continental Congress recognized the need for an army but at the same time, the founders of our society realized that control of the military must remain with the elected civilian governmental representatives. In drafting the Constitution of the United States, specific powers were given to the Congress with regard to military affairs. Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution states that Congress will:

- Raise and support armies.
- Make rules for their governance and regulation.
- Provide for organizing, arming, disciplining and calling out the militia.
- Exercise legislation over forts, magazines, arsenals, dock-yards, and buildings.
- Declare war.

These constitutional mandates inserted the Congress directly into the military affairs of the nation and established a bond between the first Congress and the first Army of the United States. The Congress authorized, built, armed and supported the Army during the ensuing years.

The concept of civilian control of the military was thus established in the United States. This concept has withstood

the test of time and has never been challenged with one exception. The one exception took place about two years after the surrender of British forces at Yorktown. During this period following the war, Congress had moved to significantly reduce the size of the Army. As a result, a group of disenchanted Army officers drafted a pact calling for a military takeover of the government. General George Washington heard of the pact and immediately took control of the situation. He convinced the officers that their proposals were contradictory to everything they had fought for. Thus, a military coup was avoided. This was the first and last time in our country's short history that the threat of a military takeover surfaced.

The bond between the Congress and the Army has remained over the years. There have been ups and downs, but generally speaking, the Army has enjoyed a partnership rather than an adversarial relationship with the Congress particularly during World War II and into the late 1950's. However, during the last decade and a half the bond has been stretched at times almost to the breaking point. The unpopularity of the war in Vietnam, the political nature of the defense appropriations process, and the poor performance of the economy have all converged to heap criticism on the defense establishment. As could be expected, the Army has felt its share of the sting. The Army by no means can be blamed in all instances, but there have been times when our actions (or lack of action) increased the level of skepticism by Congress of Army policies and programs. It would not be fair to single out only the Army as the sole benefactor of

congressional criticism. The entire defense establishment and other governmental agencies have been involved. What is important now is for the Army leadership to work at ways of increasing our credibility and minimizing the skepticism of Congress. Historically speaking, the Army should have the edge when dealing with Congress. But the fact remains, much of the edge has been lost due to the Army's lack of aggressiveness when dealing with the hill.

CHAPTER III
CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORITY AND POLITICS IN
MILITARY APPROPRIATIONS

About now some understanding of congressional authority and responsibility might be appropriate. As mentioned before, Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution charges Congress with the responsibility for raising armies and also raising revenues to support government activities. A safe assumption would then be that the armed forces exist at the pleasure of Congress. No other branch of government has the power to raise and maintain armed forces. Thus, it follows that when Congress perceives no further need for a military force, then such forces should cease to exist.

Article 1 contains other areas of responsibility for Congress such as the "general welfare" provision which covers a myriad of agencies and departments. Funding of these agencies is in competition with the armed forces for the attention of Congress. As with the armed forces, when Congress perceives no further justification for their existence, they, to, will be terminated.

No one expects Congress to terminate many agencies especially the Department of Defense. What, then, can be expected short of complete dissolution? One reasonable assumption is that Congress will scrutinize all activities to determine the necessity for maintaining the armed forces, and to what degree. This happens each year at budget time.

Whereas the budget of the United States is a series of appropriations, its main function is control. Like any other budget, it is a management tool controlled by Congress. Activities of the armed forces are limited by the amount of money Congress appropriates. By approving an authorization and appropriation for military expenditure, the Congress votes to maintain an armed force. But the amount of the appropriation also reveals the degree to which Congress perceives the need for that force.

In time of war or hostilities, the need is readily apparent but in time of peace, the need is easily overlooked or ignored especially when other, more apparent, needs are prevalent. Advocates of these other needs quickly become antagonists of the military requirements. They become skeptics and seek out information and situations to back up their skepticism. They find it in most instances. Material to support skepticism is abundant for anyone who cares to dig and analyze his diggings.

The politics of military appropriations is another area that must not be overlooked when seeking answers to the problem of military resources. The power of a strong member of Congress can be brutally applied when necessary. Note the following example.

At the banquet honoring Stennis in Jackson, Rivers showed up to deliver one of his crass speeches in which he got off a sally that gains its humor only from candor: "I don't believe the Yankees will pick a fight with us again, because when we get through there'll be precious few installations left north of the Mason-Dixon line." ¹

This is just one example of the power that can be wielded by a member of Congress. In this case it was L. Mendel Rivers who was Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee for many years. Mendel Rivers brought to the constituency of his district many dollars in federal payrolls and contracts.

Chairmanship of committees can be powerful positions and certainly there are members of Congress today who have such power, ie; Senator John Tower of Texas, the present Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee. In many instances the chairman is able to guide committee proceedings as he sees fit. During the past few years, this power has caused some committee members to drift slowly away from unanimity. They have become critical of the way business is conducted. Some even complain openly that certain chairman are too close to Pentagon officials and exclude other committee members from vital information. Congressmen, having shown great individualism in being elected by their constituents, should be expected to take exception to such tactics. Leaders are not likely to sit still very long when there is a cause for which they feel obligated to support.

In 1974, congressional elections presaged the events of 1975 relating to congressional activity. The new talents, elected in 1969, seemed to have melded with the dissidents that were reelected. In 1975, senior committee chairmen were unseated, including the House Armed Services Committee Chairman, F. Edward Herbert. This mean't that more voices were being heard and more questions were being asked. Looking at it in

the long run could possibly mean that even the Armed Services Committees could become less of advocates of defense policy and more of advocates of congressional control.

Still, the politics of military appropriations cannot be overlooked. Today in Congress there is a loosely knit "reform caucus" of about 50 members ranging from conservative Republicans to liberal Democrats. They have tried to chart a course between the hawks and the doves with the goal being not on where to cut the military budget, but where to replace with something more cost effective. Senator Gary Hart of Colorado is one of the group's founders. Among leading members are Democratic Senators Carl Levin of Michigan and Sam Nunn of Georgia. Republican Senators William Cohen of Maine and Warren Rudman of New Hampshire and Republican Representatives Newt Gingrich of Georgia and William Whitehurst of Virginia are some of the other members of the group.

So far the caucus has had little success. Some say the reason is that members of the reform caucus agree on little and others argue that the caucus members are as susceptible as any member of Congress to seeking pork for their constituents. For example, Mr. Whitehurst rejects the reformer's position that two new nuclear aircraft carriers are unnecessary; they are being built near his Norfolk, Virginia district. Senator Nunn defends the controversial C-5 aircraft; they are made in Georgia.

Indeed, the scramble for goodies for constituents seems to be the overriding concern of many members of Congress. Even the

doves who argue most for defense cuts have their interests. House Speaker O'Neil and Senator Kennedy support the F-18 because its engines are built in Massachusetts. Even Senator Proxmire added \$100 million to the defense budget last year by winning approval for a new minesweeper to be built in Wisconsin. Whether we agree or disagree, this is a fact of life in the Congress.

CHAPTER IV

CONGRESSIONAL TRENDS (1969-PRESENT) THE PERIOD OF CHANGING CONGRESSIONAL ATTITUDES

Some discussion of the period of changing congressional attitudes is necessary in order to bring the current congressional trends into perspective. It is better to approach this discussion from the standpoint of the Department of Defense rather than single out a particular service. The subject matter contains references pertaining to Army, Air Force and Navy situations which led to much criticism of the overall defense establishment.

During the twenty year period following World War II, there was widespread consensus in both houses of Congress on the need for a strong defense. The Korean War and Soviet incursions in Eastern Europe stimulated the United States perception of a threat. Large defense budgets were routinely authorized and rarely debated so that Congress could raise and equip an armed force second to none. Congressional support of this effort was enthusiastic. The Department of Defense merely determined its requirements and the appropriations would appear. The necessity to sell a defense budget hardly existed. Any voices of dissent in the Congress went unheard. In the early 1960's, some voices of dissent became noticeable, but even as late as 1966, the military appropriations bill sailed through the Congress without so much as a roll call vote.

By 1969, however, dissent had gained considerable support from various factions and triggered the beginning of a period of turmoil in the history of the United States. The military came

under fire from several directions. Issues such as the questionable activities of servicemens clubs in West Germany---rigged slot machines, falsified records, kickbacks and cover-ups and similar activities in Vietnam were revealed.¹ The Air Force did not escape either. Cost overruns on the C-5A were made public and the outcry went up from the Congress. The Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) began receiving much criticism on the college campuses of the nation. The Navy received much adverse publicity as a result of the accidental sinking of a nuclear submarine in San Francisco Bay due to "culpable negligence" of shipyard workers.² The Army was also plagued by the revelation of the My Lai massacre.

During 1969, congressional dissatisfaction with the Selective Service System came to light. Sweeping changes to the system were proposed because of inequities in the selection of draftees. Also this same year Senator J.W. Fulbright was taking well aimed political shots at the Pentagon for doing a big business in public relations. The Air Force received special mention when he wrote:

"There is, of course, nothing sinister about all of these community relations activities. Nor is the rest of the huckstering the Air Force carries on itself meretricious. I am, however, deeply bothered by its goal---persuading the American people of the special importance of the Air Force in our society and of its need for more and more of the country's resources. The goal of the Air Force up to now has certainly been achieved. Measured in dollars, its public relations program must be termed a resounding success in obtaining and spending the taxes of the citizens of this country."³

These and other acts caused many outcrys in the public

sector. The press took a hard stand against the Defense Department and advocated sweeping changes in its operations. As could be expected, more Senators and Representatives became critics of defense policy. As a result, military spending came under heavy attack. Other Senators such as Hart (D-Michigan), Cranston (D-California), Eagleton (D-Missouri), Mathias (R-Maryland), Saxbe (R-Ohio) and Schweiker (R-Pennsylvania) joined forces with Senators Fulbright and Proxmire to dress down the Defense Department at every opportunity. In the House, five critics were members of the powerful Armed Services Committee.⁴ Here we see the beginning of the break in political party lines. Congressmen began following their feelings rather than bending under pressure from their parties. Bi-partisan politics really began coming of age.

Normally the armed forces and appropriations committees handled the business of the Defense Department, but 1969, found other committees digging into the defense establishment. The Defense Department found itself being investigated by the Subcommittee on Disarmament of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The forces working for disarmament saw increased military spending on anti-ballistic missiles and MIRV as a threat to reaching arms limitation agreements with the Soviets. On 7 August, 1969, fifty senators voted against the deployment of a major strategic weapons system. This vote is widely recognized as the turning point in congressional concern and control over the Department of Defense. The military budget also began coming under heavy fire. Led by Subcommittee Chairman Proxmire, the

Joint Economic Subcommittee on Economy in Government held a series of hearings on the military budget's impact on domestic programs.

The Department of Defense was on the defensive for many reasons during 1969. The Vietnam War was responsible for much of the action against DOD. Richard Nixon became president on a platform that promised an early withdrawal of troops and an end to the war. To many congressmen this meant that funds could be redirected to domestic programs that had been neglected during the war. The defense budget was expected to be decreased accordingly. The political process brought about a rise of political coalitions of various anti-defense and anti-Vietnam factions. Congressmen who championed domestic causes were brought into the fold. In some instances their goals were different, but they all figured to reach their goals at the expense of the Defense Department.

Considering everything, 1969 was a bad year for the military. DOD was constantly being called to task for activities of its subordinate agencies. The American public was demanding answers to some embarrassing questions. Congress was reacting to the pulse of the nation when it started to ask many of the same questions. At times congressmen were frustrated trying to get answers and, as a result, many became even more suspicious of DOD operations. This same year the House passed a bill imposing a "\$192.9 billion limit on fiscal year 1970 spending."⁵ This was the first real attempt to control all federal spending. The mood of Congress toward the defense establishment was best

summed up by Representative George H. Mahon (D-Texas), Chairman of the House Appropriations Committee, when he accused the military of having "generated a lack of confidence by its many mistakes."⁶ At about the same time, the Senate passed a bill "requiring disclosure by employees of defense contractors of previous employment by the Pentagon, and vice versa."⁷ The Safeguard ABM Bill passed the Senate by a one vote margin. Not since the World War II draft law of 1941, had a national security issue stood such a test.⁸

The defense establishment entered the 1970's under fire from Congress. Skepticism of the military by Congress had risen to unprecedented levels. Some have even termed it as a period of a great moral epidemic. But whatever it is called, the basic reasons were these:

First: The war in Vietnam, from the military viewpoint a limited war for limited objectives, continued with no satisfactory conclusion.

Second: The voice of the dissenters, those who held that the original commitment was immoral, was steadily magnified and increasingly better organized. Of possibly greater significance than the voice of the radical dissenters, was the decrease of public support for the commitment which fueled the fire of congressional skepticism.

And third: The undeniably great impact of the cost of national security on the federal budget, at a time when domestic ills were in great need of cure. So the stage was set for a level of congressional concern over military affairs as never

before seen in our country.

In April, 1970, President Nixon announced the joint US/South Vietnamese incursion into Cambodia to clear out sanctuaries used by the North Vietnamese. The incursion was to help shorten the war, but many looked upon it as an expansion of the war. A wave of dissent was triggered about the country mainly on college campuses. Congressional critics immediately charged the administration with widening the war. Led by the Senate, opposition to the drive into Cambodia erupted in Congress and brought about a growing concern over the Constitutional conflict in the authority to wage war. The incursion into Cambodia prompted a barrage of political, legislative and legal actions against administration policy. Legislative actions were taken in both the House and Senate to deny funds for the incursion. In the Senate, war critics worked on a three way strategy to bar funds for use of combat troops in Cambodia, to repeal the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution and to require a complete troop withdrawal from Vietnam by the middle of 1971. Congress was now exercising its power of the purse strings over the defense establishment and the administration. The legislative actions taken by Congress during the early 1970's eventually led to the passage of the War Powers Act of 1973 in which Congress asserted itself as watchdog over the Commander-in-Chief and the Department of Defense.

In 1974, the Congress passed the Budget Impoundment and Control Act which completely revamped the budget process. Budget Committees were created in both Houses and new steps were introduced in the authorization and appropriation process. It

was for certain that no federal spending would ever again go unquestioned and unchecked through the legislative process. The Budget Act, born of and passed by Congress, was intended to improve congressional control over budgetary outlays and receipts, determine annual spending targets in light of economic conditions and needs, and allocate available funds among federal programs on the basis of national priorities. In short, Congress wanted more control over government spending and with this new law, it placed major responsibilities on its own shoulders. The President would now submit his proposed budget to the Congress for a systematic examination of the economy, national needs, taxes, revenues, and debts before any decisions would be made on spending. As a result, more in-depth looks would be taken at defense spending.

The value of the Budget Act can be debated both pro and con for weeks on end. The process has been cumbersome, but practically speaking, the act is still new. Did Congress pass this act because it did not trust the military? Perhaps this might have been one of the reasons, but the major reason was to get more control over federal spending in general. Whatever the reasons were, the outcome sent out a significant signal to the military; working relations with the Congress would have to be improved.

Throughout the remainder of the 1970's, the military set about trying to overcome the wounds suffered during the Vietnam era. Budget resources did not suffer so much at the hands of Congress as they did from the administrations in some instances.

However, Congress desired to reorder national priorities and reassert its congressional role in military policy and affairs. This desire was fueled by disillusionment about Vietnam, soaring costs of defense systems and costly overruns on weapons systems. Public opinion toward military spending was changing more significantly than ever before, and many congressional anti-militarists were responding to this public opinion. As a result, the Defense Department was faced with trying to modernize our much neglected forces during a time when domestic spending was rapidly becoming the order of the day.

This period should be considered one of the most important times in our nation's history from the standpoint of legislative actions. The Congress reaffirmed its role in the raising and supporting of our nation's military forces. To deal effectively with Congress today, we must understand what happened in the recent past.

CHAPTER V
THE CONGRESS NOW

The preceding chapters have been used to set the stage for a discussion of the current Congress and the members we will be working with in the years to come. More than ever before, the Army will be dealing face to face on a daily basis with many members as they seek information to make their voting decisions. We will not only be dealing with the "hawks", but our primary target audience will most likely be the "doves" or those members who are taking the middle ground. In any event, we must be knowledgeable of the makeup of Congress.

During the past few years, particularly the 97th Congress and the current 98th Congress, there has been a turning point in the members elected to both the House and the Senate. The average age of the Senate and House has decreased and the percentage of members with less tenure has increased. The following information applies to the current Congress:

YOUNGER

HOUSE

8 Members under 30
84 Members age 30-40
Average age 48.4

SENATE

10 Senators under 40
46 Senators age 40-50
Average age 52.6

LESS TENURE

HOUSE

Over half under 4 years service
(17% Freshmen)

SENATE

Over half under 6 years service
(18% Freshmen)

Although this information may vary with each election, the point

is that the Congress has become somewhat younger, and at the present time there are many members in both Houses who are still relatively new to the hill. These newer members will be less inhibited by old procedures and programs. They are not so quick to bow to pressure, and as can be seen everyday, they certainly are not afraid to challenge the more senior members.

Members of Congress come from all walks of life and professional backgrounds. Most are, or have been, lawyers, but there are others from fields such as education and agriculture. The dominant professional backgrounds for the current Congress are:

LAW.....	47%
BUSINESS.....	29%
EDUCATION.....	10%
PUBLIC SERVICE.....	9%
AGRICULTURE.....	5%

Members of Congress make up a reasonably good cross section of our country. Further, there are 18 women in Congress (16 in the House and 2 in the Senate) and 18 Black Americans (all in the House).

Contrary to much thought, there is still quite a number of members of Congress who have served in the armed Forces. Of the 535 members of the current Congress, over half have served in the military, predominately the Army and Navy. Members with military service have been decreasing for the past few years. The following information presents a capsulized accounting of

military veterans who have served in Congress since 1972.

	<u>HOUSE MEMBERS</u> (435)	<u>SENATE MEMBERS</u> (100)
93rd Congress	289	71
94th Congress	306	73
95th Congress	313	64
96th Congress	242	58
97th Congress	269	73
98th Congress	260	72

As time goes on it is anticipated that we will see more members elected to Congress with little or no military experience. We must be prepared for this when we deal with them.

While speaking of the military service of members, it is interesting to note that 84 Senators and 144 Representatives have a major Army installation in their state or district and 98 Senators and 386 Representatives have a major defense contractor in their state or district. When you consider the other services and their installations and agencies, the military is well represented across a wide geographical area. Members of Congress cannot overlook the importance of the military presence in their areas. This will cause members to seek much information concerning military affairs. So one must expect that the less experience a member has on military matters, the more questions he will ask.

Now that we have looked at the makeup of Congress, we should consider the congressional trends that have surfaced particularly since the beginning of the Reagan Administration. The 97th Congress (1981) brought with it quite a number of new members, both Democratic and Republican, as a result of the 1980 elections. A new attitude swept across Capitol Hill which had been absent for

some time. The 97th Congress could be characterized as follows:

- Junior members outspoken and aggressive
- Liberal ranks thinned-shift to the conservative right
- Looked closely at foreign policy
- Looked closely at increased spending
- Stronger emphasis on defense
- Supported growth of authorization controls
- Pressure to balance the budget and reduce deficits
- Emphasis on the elimination of waste, fraud and abuse

To the military man or the pro-defense congressman times looked better. True, we did accomplish much during 1981 and 1982, but still we did not get blanket approval of our military spending as we might have thought. Tough questions were asked, and many hours of hard work by all services went into the preparation of budget hearings. The pressure to balance the budget and reduce deficits became the order of the day. Even with the emphasis on a strong defense, defense appropriations were not easy. To sell a program, the Pentagon had to be prepared. The problem is even more difficult when you have a House and Senate controlled by different parties. The success of the administration during the 97th Congress can be attributed in large part to Democratic members of the House who chose to break with party lines and support bi-partisan positions.

The elections of 1982 brought about even more changes in congressional trends. As a result of the general public's feelings toward the Reagan Administration's handling of the economy, the Democrats gained quite a few seats in the House

and solidified their party position. Republicans remained in control of the Senate. As a result, the 98th Congress (1983) brought with it an even different look and attitude. Although we have had only a short look at the new Congress, it could be characterized as follows:

- Increased legislative experience
- Major leadership remains stable
- Decreased military experience
- Increased support of budget balancing initiatives
- Increased grassroots interest in military/
international affairs
- Intense scrutiny for all new spending
- Increased sensitivity to domestic/social issues
- Movement towards independent voting stance

Note two important items that surface with the 98th Congress. There is no mention of stronger emphasis on defense and increased sensitivity to domestic/social issues has been renewed. To this point in time, the 98th Congress has been a hard sell on defense authorizations. The President's own party has broken ranks in both Houses to recommend drastic cuts in defense spending. This trend could do much damage to the modernization efforts of all the services if it is not reversed. Here again, we see the power of the purse being exercised by Congress. The time is not unlike some of the times discussed earlier in this study. Even with some improvement in the economy, defense spending will be tightly controlled by Congress. It is not likely that this trend will be reversed in the near future.

Does this mean that Congress does not favor a strong defense? Most likely it does, however, as with the period after the Vietnam War, other priorities are of more concern at the moment. It will be our responsibility to insure that defense is not overlooked or ignored, even as frustrating as the task will seem at times.

What we are seeing is a legislative versus executive power struggle on the hill. Members of Congress are reasserting their roles in foreign policy, defense policy, and domestic and budgetary affairs. The use of legislative vetoes and restrictions cannot be ruled out. The political disassociations of members will affect the decisions that will have to be made by the Department of Defense. The forces of change have been philosophical in some respects, while others have resulted from the bad times we experienced during the last decade and a half.

The current Congress is determined to put its own imprint of federal policy. It is determined to have its independence from the executive branch. This move toward independence is not new. It was one of the main goals that united Senators and Representatives who wrote the budget reform act in 1974. They worked during a period of bitter confrontation between a Republican President and a Democratic Congress. Although the congressional majority was more in tune with President Carter than it had been with Presidents Nixon and Ford, Carter's proposals for spending were not given a rubber stamp. The budget reform act became a major factor in the shaping of legislation and remains so today. Budget reform made Congress

confront the issues of fiscal policy and spending priorities. As Alexander Hamilton expected two hundred years ago, the power of Congress over the purse would become "the most complete and effectual weapon with which any constitution can arm the immediate representatives of the people."

One of the biggest mistakes we could make would be to label the Congress in general as irresponsible. Congressmen work long and hard, and while they are charged with writing laws and monitoring the federal agencies, they note in private conversations that the demands of constituents and their own desire to be reelected, means they spend most of their time on constituent affairs. Many of the record number of members who retired at the end of the 95th and 96th Congress cited as a primary reason the constituent demands - both reasonable and absurd - which prevented them from giving adequate time to the business of legislation.

There has been a noticeable shift from the so called pork-barrel politics during the last few years. The interventions of Congress in strategic weapons policy, defense budgeting and foreign policy has been unprecedented. With the war powers legislation of the 1970's, Congress shouldered the responsibility of facing the grave issues of war and peace. It is not likely that future Congresses will roll over and play dead. The real Congress today is vastly different from the caricatures which we see everyday. The recent congressional trends in the legislature point toward a rejuvenation of the constitutional balance of power which requires a creative and responsible Congress.

CHAPTER VI
WORKING WITH CONGRESS

There is no question that during the past two and one half years there has been a distinct change in support of a stronger defense, but the fact remains that no federal agency, including defense, will receive unlimited funds. President Reagan promised a strong defense in light of the ever widening Soviet threat. There is some hope that Congress and the general public will begin to see the threat as it is. The current administration enjoyed much success with the defense budget during the first two years, however, it was not without a fight. It is amazing to think of what has been accomplished in such a short time, but that has been only a drop in the bucket. The fight is becoming tougher each day as we witness the constant political struggle being waged between the Congress and the executive branch. If the Army is going to maintain any of the momentum with our force modernization and improvement programs, we must continue to work at improving our relations with Congress. The question of congressional support of the military can be argued extensively, but the fact remains, we must be totally prepared to justify our needs and use our resources wisely.

Current Army programs and efforts have brought about an increased emphasis on our working relations with Congress. The focal point of Army contact with Congress is the Office of the Chief of Legislative Liaison (OCLL). Besides OCLL, only three organizations are authorized to conduct routine, but very specific,

liaison with the Congress. These are the Comptroller of the Army, the Chief of Engineers and the Adjutant General. All other Army agencies must coordinate any congressional activities with OCLL. Army Regulation 1-20 spells out the responsibilities explicitly with regard to congressional activities. Specifically these responsibilities are:

- The Chief of Legislative Liaison is responsible for liaison between the Army and the committees of Congress except for appropriations committees and other specified areas which are the responsibility of the Comptroller of the Army, Chief of Engineers and the Adjutant General.

- The Chief of Engineers is authorized to communicate directly with the Congress on appropriations matters that pertain solely to the civil works program. Other communications will be through OCLL.

- The Adjutant General's office is the primary contact for the Army with the Joint Committee on Printing.

OCLL is organized under the Office of the Secretary of the Army. The job of the Chief of Legislative Liaison is to manage the interface between the Army and the Congress so as to insure that the Army's programs are presented and considered in the best possible light by Congress. To accomplish the congressional liaison function, OCLL is organized with six divisions as follows:

- HOUSE AND SENATE LIAISON DIVISIONS

- Located on the hill in the office buildings of the respective Houses of Congress.

- Acts as eyes and ears for the Army.
- Answers quick reaction telephone inquiries from members.
- Act as escorts for congressional trips.
- Performs a host of other duties where face-to-face contact with members is needed.

● PLANS AND OPERATIONS DIVISION

- The nerve center for day-to-day contact with committee members and staffers and with other congressional leaders on current issues.
- Responsible for annual authorization bill.
- Arranges for appearances of Army witnesses before congressional committees.
- Keeps Congress informed on any matters of interest (ie; award of contracts, closure of an activity or base, military construction).

● INVESTIGATIONS AND LEGISLATION DIVISION

- Staffed with lawyers.
- Monitors all Army bills except authorizations and appropriations. Handles about 1000 bills each year.
- Handles investigations of Army activities by congressional committees.

● ADMINISTRATION DIVISION

- Provides administrative support and coordinates arrangements for congressional trips sponsored by the Army.

● CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRY DIVISION

- Receives about 30,000 written inquiries a year from the Congress.
- Obtains information from Army staff or field commanders and provides official Army response.

In summary, OCLL responsibilities are:

- To serve as the main point of contact between Army and Congress.
- To assist the Army in preparation of the annual legislative program.
- To assist with legislation introduced by individual members of Congress.
- To handle investigations of Army activities.
- To sense the attitude of Congress.

It is very important that the role of OCLL be known and understood because this office provides the daily face-to-face communication with the hill.

There are six primary committees that the Army deals with daily. They are commonly referred to as the "Big Six" and consist of the House and Senate Budget Committees (HBC/SBC), the House and Senate Armed Services Committees (HASC/SASC), and the House and Senate Appropriations Committees (HAC/SAC). These committees are key to the authorization and appropriations processes. Both the House and Senate Appropriations Committees are organized with a number of subcommittees which handle various federal agencies. The Army's interface with the appropriations committees is through the Defense and Military

Construction Subcommittees. Needless to say, our contact with these subcommittees is critical.

The Armed Forces Committees in both Houses also have a number of subcommittees, but the difference is that we must be prepared to deal with any or all of the subcommittees.

SASC SUBCOMMITTEES

MANPOWER AND PERSONNEL
MILITARY CONSTRUCTION
PREPAREDNESS
SEA POWER AND FORCE PROJECTION
STRATEGIC AND THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES
TACTICAL WARFARE

HASC SUBCOMMITTEES

INVESTIGATIONS
MILITARY INSTALLATIONS AND FACILITIES
MILITARY PERSONNEL AND COMPENSATION
PROCUREMENT AND MILITARY NUCLEAR SYSTEMS
READINESS
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
SEAPOWER AND STRATEGIC AND CRITICAL MATERIALS

Although the organization of the SASC and HASC differs with respect to subcommittee organization, their functions are very similar. A point to bring out at this time is that neither the SASC or HASC has a subcommittee which deals primarily with land forces. Seapower and airpower are well covered as can be seen by the list of subcommittees.

The organization of the House and Senate Budget Committees differs somewhat. The SBC has no formal subcommittee organization. However, there are staff members appointed to oversee defense authorizations. The HBC is organized with a number of task forces to oversee authorizations for the various federal agencies. In the case of the HBC, the military services deal

with the National Security and Veterans task forces. The budget committees do not normally get into the line by line details of the defense budget and the appropriations and armed services committees. However, this has changed during recent budget cycles because of the economy and a renewed interest in domestic/social spending programs. Military contact with the budget committees is increasing with time.

The committees discussed hold the key to the success of our programs. The way we conduct our affairs with them will make the difference. The Army's responsibility is to provide accurate and timely information throughout the legislative cycle. We cannot afford to overlook or ignore this most important facet of our work. These committees are made up of members who see things differently, and as discussed previously, members who are not afraid to speak out or break with traditional party lines. Not all are "pro" defense by any means which when looked at practically, provides in-house checks and balances in the legislature.

It would be impossible in this study to analyze each and every member of the committees just mentioned. More importantly, we cannot confine our interests only to the members who serve on these committees. There are 535 members of Congress who have a vote in the legislative decisions made on the hill. Army representatives never know from day to day which member they will be dealing with and what information the member wants or needs. One of the first questions we should seek to answer is where the member stands on defense or Army issues and what are his

legislative objectives in the area of military policy? For the individual legislator, these objectives will most probably depend on his basic outlook; whether he or she is satisfied or dissatisfied with the current military policies of the nation. Military policy influences and is influenced by domestic and foreign policy. From a host of interrelated policy issues, a member of Congress adopts what we simply refer to as a "pro" or "anti" defense stance. Within the "pro" defense group are those members who see no conflict at all between their own goals, values, beliefs and attitudes and those of the Department of Defense. Their primary objectives are to maintain a strong military establishment and preserve the United States as the number one global power. However, in recent years other members whom we can consider to be "pro" defense, have become increasingly concerned with the costs of military weapons systems and economic considerations of military policy. Their objectives are similar to the former's, but with the added goals of minimizing costs and making the most of our resources.

The objectives of members opposed to or dissatisfied with military policy can also be subdivided. One group favors general American disengagement or nonintervention. They constantly seek a reordering of national priorities. On the other hand, another group shares these sentiments but stresses the costs involved. It might be said that they are critics more of specific expenditures than of general strategic considerations.

As pointed out previously in this study, there are objectives

which are shared by the "pro" and "anti" defense members. These are to establish strong legislative oversight over the Department of Defense and to correct the imbalance between the executive and legislative branches of the government.

Whatever the position of a member might be, in many instances he will be seeking information from the military. Often we find that those members most opposed to DOD policies and most concerned with exercising greater legislative oversight will be the ones seeking the greatest amount of information from any and all sources. It seems that the more a member views himself as an advocate of the military the more content he is to rely on the authority of the President and the judgment and expertise of the military.

Congressmen have a myriad of information resources available to them. Some of these are: constituents, hearings and reports, lobbyists, floor debates, party caucuses, individual colleagues, the Library of Congress, mass media, the press, memos, briefings and last, but not least, the congressional staff members who serve on the committee staffs and personal staffs of members of Congress.

Most of our dealings with Congress will be arranged either by a committee staff member or a member of a Congressman's personal staff. In many instances, business will be conducted with a staffer who is representing the member of Congress and the member will never be seen. Those dealing with a committee or an individual member of Congress must expect to see a staff member before ever seeing a member. Many people know little about

Congress and even less about the numerous assistants on the committees, on the personal staffs of Senators or Representatives, and in central support groups such as the Library of Congress, the Government Printing Office and the General Accounting Office.

Congressional staff growth has been significant over the past twenty years. During the period 1960 to 1980, the committee and personal staffs of members of Congress increased from approximately 6200 persons to 18,000 persons. Another 18,000 were employed in the central support groups. There has been little change during the last three years. What has caused this growth in the congressional staff? Legislative decision making has become more and more complex with time. Congressmen view staff assistance as important to policy formulation, constituent service and power acquisition. The key aspects of what makes Congress run involve the staffs. Many congressional outputs are the results of staffs who conceptualize, write, type and communicate the many ideas and messages required in the legislative arena. It is no longer possible for a member to serve in Congress without the assistance provided by the staff.

Staff members, for the most part, are relatively young, but there are still many who have served on committee and personal staffs for many years. The latter provide the staff continuity that is needed on the hill. These more experienced staff members know the legislative business and the functions of the various federal agencies. Most become experts in some areas such as defense or social programs. Their areas of

specialization are a result in most cases of the member's individual interests. There are other staff members who are young and inexperienced. These young staffers are looking to make their mark on the world. Frequently they will drop the name of a member to gain access to information. For the most part they are tolerated by members of the federal agencies until they learn their jobs. The more experienced staffers will normally watch the younger staffers closely and guide them through their daily routines. This is not at all unlike our Army.

There are those committee and personal staff members who gain much power and influence. Committee staff directors are good examples. They are normally considered extremely influential and at times very powerful. Most personal staff take on the personality of the member for whom they work. Committee staff members are influenced both by the congressional members making up the committees and, of course, by the majority party controlling the committee. As a result, we find the "pro" and "anti" defense factions in the staff as well as the Congress itself. It is important for anyone dealing with Congress to know the key staff members and their positions on defense programs, domestic affairs, national security issues, etc.

Like it or not, our daily business with the hill will be conducted mostly with staff members, not the members of Congress. We must know these staff members well. We must stay in touch with those who generally support our defense programs. Likewise,

it behooves us to know those who do not normally support our programs and why. In some cases they will be the key to the success of a program. A case in point is the current Army M-1 tank program. For years, the program was debated, delayed, restarted, debated and delayed again. Nevertheless, the M-1 tank finally became a reality because of the efforts of a long time member of the House Armed Services Committee staff. This staff member knew the needs of the Army and committed himself to getting the program underway.

Thus, the message is that staff do much of the congressional work. A case could be made that staff have too much influence, authority and power. Legislative aides can significantly influence congressional decision making. In many instances their expertise and judgement are critical. Congressmen depend on staff to help in identifying issues and developing positions. They conduct research and draft legislation. They control communications into and within committee and personal offices. They coordinate legislative strategy and brief congressmen on pending legislation. Most importantly, they are expected to offer their opinions and act as sounding boards for Senators and Representatives.

To be effective in working with Congress, care must be taken to be extremely knowledgeable of the members of Congress and their staff representatives. Only then can we be successful with our programs.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This discussion of the Congress, its past history, its trends and the way it does business brings out some conclusions that should be considered. Hindsight, if employed wisely, can be used to sharpen foresight, and we would be remiss if we did nothing to offset past criticisms. The task is complex because it requires a break with tradition in some instances. In some cases our problems and solutions have been given much lip service but little aggressive action.

Our reporting system philosophy must be overhauled. There must be allowances for reporting bad information without retribution. The practice of singling out a human sacrifice must be abandoned. This does not mean that inefficiency will be tolerated, but rather a day in court should be the rule of management when dealing with suspected poor performance. Too many commanders, supervisors and managers are opposed to adverse reports. Often a bad news report causes hardship for the responsible office rendering the report. This sometimes results in daily status reports to quickly correct the situation because no one likes to be bothered with daily status reports. That same dislike for status reports will cause almost everyone to hold back bad news in the future. If someone is fired who reveals faults, fear will cause withholding of the whole situation. Thus, we will continue to have leaders suffer embarrassment through ignorance.

Another problem area alluded to in this report was the manner in which witnesses answer questions before congressional committees. So many of the replies given do not answer questions; they give defensive rebuttals to the implications and perceived insinuations of the question. This seems to be an art or a learned skill. Sometimes it smacks of a lack of knowledge. We must insure that we have knowledgeable witnesses. Our witnesses need not have complete knowledge, but they should have experts with them as backups and they should use them. We must remember that committees are the eyes and ears of Congress. Other congressmen will rely on the committee members before making their decisions. One disgruntled committee member might influence several other congressmen. Military witnesses would do well to give good, simple answers to questions; answers that politicians understand.

Another area that we should watch closely deals with briefings given to members of Congress or their staffs. Many legislators are skeptical of the military briefings. A perfect example took place during a personal conversation with congressman who has long been considered as "anti" military. His statement went something like this, "The Pentagon briefing has not been called a new art form for nothing. Not only is it slick and professional, complete with colored slides and charts, but it is so designed as to divert the congressman's attention away from the real issues in defense to a morass of side issues." Like it or not there are congressmen who feel this way and we must be aware of it. As mentioned previously concerning hearings, our briefings must be straightforward, as simple as possible and presented in an

understandable manner.

The political in-fighting that prevails in Congress over defense spending is strictly a political phenomenon that should be avoided completely by the military. To be sure, we want to sell our programs. Our legislative efforts place us in a "gray" area of lobbying that is often required. But we must know when to step in and when to back away. We cannot afford to be wrapped up in political fights which may very well hurt our efforts in the long run and place us on the edge of compromise.

Interservice rivalry must be controlled. It has, in fact, improved much over the years. It is imperative that all the services know what each other is doing or trying to accomplish. Service personnel must guard against playing one service against the other, especially before Congress. This does not mean withholding information, rather it means a witness should think of the consequences of his answer and answer accordingly, keeping in mind the big picture.

The Army has traditionally done a poor job of selling its programs on the hill when compared to other services. One of the major reasons is a lack of aggressiveness or backing away from an issue and going into a defensive posture. Perhaps this has been caused by history. In the past we had always received what we needed, but as we began our efforts to modernize and upgrade the deplorable conditions of our services, we were suddenly faced with selling big programs. Our experience was limited and, frankly, we failed to learn from our sister services. The Air Force has, without doubt, the best legislative liaison effort in the Department of Defense. The reasons for this are really quite

simple:

0 They start their staff training of officers in the Pentagon when they are young.

0 The Air staffers have more repetitive tours in the Pentagon.

0 They know their systems and can articulate their needs. The Air Force stays on the offensive when it comes to their programs. Their record of success speaks for itself. The Army would do well to examine the Air Force legislative liaison programs in much more detail.

During the discussion on the important congressional committees, it was noted that neither the Senate nor the House Armed Services Committee had a subcommittee that dealt exclusively with land forces. There are subcommittees that deal with airpower and seapower, but not landpower. We could spend many pages trying to answer why, but most probably would not find the real reason. Could it be an oversight on the part of the committees? Are our land forces so unimportant? The answer to both questions is most probably no. The Army leadership should not be content to live with this present committee organization. Every effort should be expended to rectify the situation and have the Armed Services Committees organize with a subcommittee to deal with land forces exclusively.

Our Army school system, with the exception of the Army War College, does not properly deal with the subjects of the legislative process, working with Congress and the budget process. Many officers, until they are exposed to it in Washington, do not understand the process of resources as it is hammered out each day.

This conclusion has been confirmed here at the War College as we have progressed through the school. How can we expect our officers to deal with such a complex, diverse area when they do not understand. My personal experience has been similar. Education on the legislative process, the makeup of Congress, dealing with congressmen and staffers and the authorization and appropriation process should be started in the various officer career courses and then advanced through Command and General Staff College and the War College. As boring as the subject may seem to some, it is extremely important. The Army would be remiss not to correct this situation.

It has been suggested by some very high ranking Army officials that congressmen should be trained on defense matters at one of our military schools such as the National War College. While this idea is excellent, practically speaking, it most probably would not be supported by Congress. The opinion of most congressmen is that they would not want to go to school after being elected. If anything, they would probably send one of their staff members. This in itself would not be all bad, but the return for such an effort would be of little benefit to the services. We must strive to create a system of relationships with Congress so that military men can take every opportunity to educate congressmen. Every question asked by a congressman or staffer must be handled in such a way as to create a learning experience for the person asking the question. Above all, the military man must be patient when dealing with a member or staffer.

The Army must not forget other contacts that we have with the Congress from other sources. Retired military form a large

segment of our population and give us a vital link to our Congress through local communities. Our National Guardsmen and Reservists also have contacts with the local communities and Congress that cannot be ignored. Army officers should take every opportunity to speak and write. It enhances our position with the general public and spreads the knowledge of where we are at and what we are trying to accomplish. Hence our relations with Congress improve.

President Reagan brought a new approach to military service when he became President. He has fought to improve the public opinion of the military and has been successful to a great degree. Military services have been given independence and the go-ahead to do the job for our Nation. With that independence comes the responsibility to use our resources wisely and efficiently. We have risen from the ranks of the so-called "second class" citizens. In this respect the Army must continue to work for good relations with the general public and Congress. We all have a common goal of a strong national defense to preserve our institutions of a democratic republic. The Army philosophy with Congress must be to:

- 0 Insure that Congress and the Army are partners not adversaries.

- 0 Insure that our approach is open, responsive and informative.

- 0 Keep Congress informed of plans, actions and most of all our difficulties.

NOTES ON CHAPTER III

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5. "Congress," Facts on File, Vol. XXIX, No. 1491, May 22-28, 1969, p. 329.

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7. "Senate Rejects Curb on Buying C-5A's," The New York Times, September 10, 1969, pp. 1 and 18.

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